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Abstract We investigate in this paper the skirmishes that the US dollar and the euro had 
from 2007 to 2011 and, in particular, the two distinct sharp falls that the single currency 
had in 2008 and 2010. We basically consider how impulses coming from domestic money 
markets impact on the USD/EUR exchange rate through the Eurocurrency market. Our 
findings show that the cycles in the spreads in the LIBOR rates have a bearing on the 
direction of change in the spot exchange rate in a way which is different from that predicted 
by the interest rate parity. The exposure of the value of reserve currencies to the vagaries of 
the outside circulation in the Eurocurrency and FX markets is only one of the many 
different policy implications of the current arrangement of the international monetary 
system. In the final part of the paper we also discuss some of those tied to the very 
existence of the international money market and to competition among old and emerging 
global currencies and financial centres.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
The volatility of the USD/EUR exchange rates during 
and after the great crisis of 2007-2009 and the concurrent 
swings of interest rates in the domestic and international 
money markets seem to offer an interesting case study for 
investigating the relation between interest rates and exchange 
rates. At best, the findings of our simple analysis could help to 
clarify the vexed question regarding whether and how exchange 
rates respond to interest rates. The relation is for the short 
term or the long term depending on whether nominal or real 
magnitudes, respectively, are taken into consideration.  We 
will concentrate on nominal magnitudes and, in particular, on 
LIBOR
1 rates, which at least since Frenkel and Levitch (1975) 
have been the preferred benchmark for tests regarding interest 
rate parities. During the crisis LIBOR rates were under 
investigation
2, but they remain key rates in the international 
money market. 
 
Exchange rates obviously reflect many other variables 
other than interest rates and prices. The current account, the 
net position in foreign assets, economic growth and merger and 
acquisition activities are only some of features of the 
macroeconomic scenario in which exchange rates move. Many 
efforts have been made in analysing exchange rates behaviour 
within comprehensive macroeconomic frameworks, but these 
frameworks have famously failed to give convincing 
explanations and reliable predictions about exchange rates (e.g. 
Frankel-Rose, 1994). Indeed, exchange rates are said to 
represent countries, their currencies and policies rather than 
companies and thus they also inevitably have meta-economic 
significance, particularly in the long run. Although exchange 
                                                 
1 LIBOR (London Inter-bank Offered Rate) is the average of the rates set for ten currencies 
and fifteen maturities, i.e. of 150 rates each business day. LIBOR rates are published daily 
by the British Bankers’ Association (http://www.bbalibor.com/) for loans ranging in 
maturity from overnight to a year. They are defined as the arithmetic mean of the middle 
eight rates declared by senior bankers in prime banks. While such rates are the banks’ 
offered rates on their own loans, EURIBOR rates (the euro equivalent for LIBOR rates), 
instead, are estimated as averages of the rates at which prime banks other than the ones 
surveyed have to borrow. LIBOR and EURIBOR rates are extremely important since they 
represent the daily benchmarks for extending credit in the international and the national 
credit markets. 
 
2 The Financial Times (Oakley, 2010) reported on investigation of the banks involved in 
setting the LIBOR before and during the 2007-2008 crisis, i.e. when worries about 
counterpart risks made strain and spreads among offered rates in the interbank market soar. 
Since banks are asked to state the offered rate, i.e. the rate at which they could borrow,  at 
the height of a liquidity crisis such as the last one a weaker bank has an incentive to 
underestimate the rate at which it can borrow to appear less weak.     2
rates are influenced by political and economic news, 
economists like to believe that they are endowed with a 
sufficient degree of capacity to revert to fundamental 
equilibrium, or at least to the mean. In this paper we 
deliberately focus on interest rates; and in looking at LIBOR 
rates we find that the USD/EUR exchange rate is clearly driven 
by the cycle in spreads, which, in turn, are supposed to reflect 
existing competition between offshore and onshore credit and 
deposit markets in any currency.  
 
Section 1 focuses on the 2008 and 2010 episodes of 
weakness in the euro and on their different nature. Section 2 
briefly summarizes the theory regarding exchange crises. 
Obvious differences exist between reserve and non-reserve 
currency crises. A crisis in a non-reserve currency is an all but 
infrequent event and the two episodes cited have been 
perceived as manifestations of intrinsic weakness, if not as 
fully-fledged crises
3. A real crisis in a reserve currency after 
the complete demonetization of gold would be a novelty that 
existing theories fail to capture; however, substitution and 
skirmishes between currencies in the evolving multi-polar 
system of flexible exchange rates may become a pretty 
recurrent event. Indeed, the current arrangement is bound to 
change in order to allow space for a new reserve currency from 
the emerging economies, or for a true supranational currency
4. 
This transition has been advocated not only by China and other 
emerging economies, but also by the United Nations. As far as 
China is concerned, the efforts that the country is making to 
turn Hong Kong into a offshore renminbi centre are noteworthy 
(He and McCauley, 2010). In Section 3, we compare the 
USD/EUR exchange rate and US dollar and euro LIBOR rates 
to ascertain whether and how they matched during the turbulent 
period extending from 2007 to early 2011. The main finding is 
that LIBOR spreads follow a cycle which is able to guide the 
trend in the USD/EUR exchange rate. Section 4 presents an 
overview of some policy implications of the enlarging offshore 
currency markets and excessive exchange rate fluctuations of 
reserve currencies. The final section briefly concludes. 
                                                 
3 In what follows, they will be called crises not only for simplicity’s sake, but also because 
speculation combined with  self-fulfilling expectations and with doubts on the long-term 
viability of the European monetary union concurred to yield a sharp fall in the single 
currency.  
4 See the 2009 Report of the UN Commission of Experts on the problems of the current 
international monetary and financial system and their call for a truly global reserve 
currency based on a broadened SDR arrangement 
(http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/FinalReport_CoE.pdf). The idea of a truly 
global reserve currency is far from new, but the rapid growth of emerging economies and 
the ensuing rebalancing of economic weights obviously gives a new perspective to the 




2. The EUR-USD exchange rate 
 
Europeans certainly took into consideration the problems 
arising when a national currency is used as an international one 
when they had to design the European Monetary System in 
1979. Instead of the Deutsch-mark, they preferred the 
European Currency Unit (ECU), a basket currency which was 
merely used as a benchmark for regulating bilateral exchange 
rates within the exchange rate mechanism of the European 
monetary system (EMS-ERM). The mechanism did not work 
well and after a decade its difficulties were maximal. The EU 
then launched the project of monetary union and replaced the 
EMS-ERM with the euro in January 1999, i.e. twenty years 
after the ECU. The new currency started circulating as the 
single currency in 2002 to foster integration not only in the 
EMU, but also to stabilize exchange rates in the rest of the 
European Union and Europe itself. While believing that the 
single market needed a single currency and that the latter 
needed a central bank, the EU thought that neither a political 
union with a federal budget nor an integrated bond market and 
effective macroeconomic policy coordination were necessary in 
order to back the single currency. The Growth and Stability 
Pact, which was intended to replace fiscal federalism, has 
proved to be quite ineffective in providing short-term 
flexibility and fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The 
latter needs a more efficient mechanism of internal adjustment 
than that provided by relative prices. The sluggishness of 
prices in combination with the price stability mandate of the 
central bank translate into permanent deflationary pressure in 
the laggard countries. As the common monetary policy is 
obviously unsuitable for reducing real divergence, large 
structural imbalances (i.e. deficits and surpluses in the current 
account) increased during the first ten years of the monetary 
union. What triggered the crisis in 2010 was actually the 
foreign debt
5 in some countries – primarily in Greece
6, 
Portugal, Spain and Ireland
7 – resulting from structural 
                                                 
5 The foreign debt results from the accumulation of liabilities, i.e. a structural deficit in a 
country’s current account.  
6 In the case of Greece, the misreporting on the actual level of the budget deficit had a 
distinct triggering effect. 
7 An excessive foreign debt is a threat to national and foreign banks. The crisis erupts in the 
capital market as the value of sovereign and corporate bonds and the value of bank stocks 
falls. In a single country the crisis is immediately passed on to the national currency, but in 
the European Monetary Union the crisis of any one of its members is transmitted to the 
common currency because adjustment mechanisms and governance are ineffective. Even   4
imbalances in the public and/or private sector and notably bank 
crises and public debt. Notwithstanding, the euro had gained a 
role as the second key currency in official exchange reserves
8. 
 
The 2007-2009 crisis was a turning point since it 
triggered heightened instability in the exchange rate between 
the two main reserve currencies. The single currency basically 
had two plunges of 21% each (Figure 1). The first was on 15 
July 2008, when it toppled from the maximum of US$ 1.599 to 
reach US$ 1.246 on 10 October 2008 (-21%). The second was 
on 3 December 2009, when it fell from US$ 1.512 to reach US$ 
1.194 on 8 June 2010 (-21%).  Although the two episodes 
produced a nominal depreciation of an almost identical size, 
they were not manifestations of the same mechanism.  
 
Figure 1 The USD/EUR Exchange Rate














The 2008 fall has been ascribed to the flight-to-safety or, 
more exactly, to the effect of the abnormal demand for dollars 
generated by the unwinding of foreign asset positions held by 
US investors. The event started with a surge of the US dollar 
vis-à-vis the euro reflecting a large conversion of euros into 
dollars through FX swaps and an increase in the LIBOR 
spreads in favour of the euro, all signalling an acute dollar 
shortage. In this sense, it can be said that the event had its 
start in the US rather than in the EU. This could have made 
surprising the fall in the single currency instead of the dollar 
if, in the same event, the US Federal Reserve had not used its 
Term Auction Facility to grant loans in dollars to a few 
                                                                                                                            
the governance reforms  introduced with the Lisbon Reform Treaty and the rescue plans 
launched in 2010 and 2011 appear unable to fix the problem.  
8 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2010) after that of the US dollar 
(62%), the euro had the largest share (27%) in global exchange reserves at the end of 2009.   5
European banks.  Indeed, the auctions which started in 
December 2007 to provide funds to banks which were facing 
difficulties in obtaining term funds in the domestic inter-bank 
market (McAndrews et al., 2008). The Federal Reserve was 
then able to maintain the effective federal funds overnight rate 
close to its target, but was unable to do the same for term loans 
since banks were reluctant to lend to each other at longer 
terms. The European Central Bank experienced the same 
problem a little later. The crisis was obviously global and, as 
was disclosed in late 2010, Barclays was a large borrower to 
buy the US operations of Lehman Bros. and a few other big 
European banks benefited from the emergency credit provided 
by the Federal Reserve (Harding et al., 2010).  
 
The December 2009 – June 2010 fall in the single 
currency was -21% (Figure 1), i.e. practically of the same 
extent as in the July-October 2008 crisis, but intrinsically 
different. It was originated by concerns over government 
finances and banks’ solvability. While the 2008 crisis occurred 
in a period in which risk appetite and funding liquidity were 
very low, the 2009-2010 crisis took hold when all financial 
systems were awash in liquidity poured in by central banks. 
Indeed, stock markets had recovered from their lows of early 
2009 and commodity prices were sloping upwards. In May 
2010, i.e. after six months of decline, the possibility of a 
further steep fall in the single currency made the possibility of 
a coordinated currency intervention surface
9. The last time that 
the ECB had intervened in the exchange market was in 
September 2000. Then, shortly after the introduction of the 
euro, the single currency was very weak. The ECB bought a 
few billion euro, but it was not alone since the US Federal 
Reserve and the central banks of Japan, Canada and Britain 
joined to help the ECB and the single currency, which then was 
slightly above $ 0.8, i.e. almost half of the peak reached in 
July 2008 (Figure 1).  The 2010 crisis can be seen more 
correctly as the result of a market perception of fragility 
stemming from internal imbalances and concerns over the 
sustainability of the EMU after the crisis and of a favourable 
environment for speculation rides
10. Indeed, a structural 
divergence seems to exist between the core and the peripheral 
countries in terms of unit labour costs and prices which the 
existing real adjustment mechanism does not seem able to curb 
effectively. Since integration inside the EMU is still imperfect, 
                                                 
9 At a Reuters Newsmaker event of mid September 2010, the well-known financier George 
Soros said that buying the euro and the debt of weaker states under attack helped the single 
currency to recover (http://about.reuters,com/events/newsmaker). 
 
10 Liquidity was plentiful and interest rates were low.   6
real adjustment requires a considerable degree of flexibility in 
the real exchange rate which, given the single currency, 
implies an identical degree of flexibility in nominal prices and 
wages. The problem is that such a degree of flexibility does 
not exist. The first ten years or so have been spent in muddling 
through without adequate progress in the working of the real 
adjustment mechanism. Current account imbalances across the 
monetary union were increasing. They reflect increasing 
differences in competitiveness and thus a biased allocation of 
the expenditure between domestic and foreign goods. At the 
same time, the persistently low level of interest rates distorted 
the choices between saving and investment (i.e. the imbalances 
just mentioned) led to divergent asset positions in the private 
sectors across member countries. This could not have taken 
hold without the bank intermediation and without an 
underestimation of the risks involved. For a long while the 
capital market did not notice the whole scenario or – and it  
amounts to the same thing – it thought that the euro zone might 
grow in a reasonably uniform way and thrive or, at least, 
provide a de facto guarantee.  The 2008-2009 crisis and the 
ensuing divergences in growth have led the market to make 
drastic changes in the relative prices of risks in sovereign and 
private debts and thus in banks’ solvency. When the crisis 
erupted, banks faced illiquidity and saw their assets 
depreciating; credit dried up and the governments made their 
debt increase rapidly after they took an active role in the 
economy. This eventually triggered the crisis in the single 
currency starting in December 2009. In early May 2010, the 
euro was plunging; EMU was close to disintegration and a first 
rescue plan was hurriedly settled by the EU, the ECB and the 
IMF
11. This was only the first in a series of decisions aimed at 
strengthening vigilance and increasing liquidity in the 
peripheral countries. According to Bini Smaghi (2010), a 
Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, the design of EMU  
is flawless , although in June 2010, i.e. after the single 
currency had plunged to $ 1.194 and the emergency plan was 
already in action, it appeared that the EMU was in need of 
some correction of its institutional weaknesses (Bini Smaghi, 
                                                 
11 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is a vehicle company created in early 
May 2010 to issue bonds for up to €440bn from the member states. Considering the €60bn 
provided by the Commission and the €250bn provided by the International Monetary Fund, 
the rescue package makes the total of €750bn. EFSF has been assigned the best possible 
credit rating by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, Aaa by Moody’s and its first two 
issuances were successfully made in 2011. They provided limited help to Greece and 
Ireland, tough???. In mid-2013, the company will be replaced by the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) a permanent crisis management institution. On March 2011, EU leaders 
endorsed the creation of the ESM and the Euro Plus Pact, a package which aims at 
removing the deep causes of the crisis. http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm 
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2010). In his view, financial markets failed to exert vigilance 
on the rise of excessive sovereign debts. Furthermore, the 
Stability and Growth Pact had been totally ineffective and, 
third, the Lisbon process, which had started in 2000, failed to 
increase competitiveness adequately in the peripheral 
countries. The emergency plan that was then devised for 
Greece and which consisted in fiscal retrenchment, was hoped 
to be the right solution, but the subsequent bail-outs of Ireland 
and Portugal proved that such an approach is not able to bring 
interest rate spreads down and allow those countries to return 
to the capital market. The alternatives appeared unpalatable. 
The exit from the EMU implies a wild depreciation of the 
national currency and a real debt shock. Euro bonds and fiscal 
transfers across member countries trigger political difficulties. 
Debt restructuring is dangerous for the European banks. The 
real problem seems to be that of the sustainability of structural 
imbalances and net liability positions in the private and public 
sectors inside a monetary union. The changed balance between 
assets and liabilities had obvious effects in the capital and the 
foreign exchange markets. The lesson that can be drawn from 
the European experience is that the degree of sustainability of 
imbalances inside a monetary union like the European one is 
not higher than that existing outside.  When the real adjustment 
mechanisms are not sufficiently effective, the non-existence of 
the exchange rate inevitably makes countries forget the 
problem of debt sustainability. In other words, by giving up the 
exchange rate, countries lose an useful warning device or 
indicator, if not an efficient adjustment mechanism. The 
existing literature has focused more on the adjustment 
potential of exchange rates than on their signalling capability. 
The fall in interest rates at global level has worsened the 
forgiveness problem. Persistent low interest rates have 
increased the appetite for credit in the private and public 
sectors and the ensuing excessive debt-building has driven 
some countries into a debt trap just when one of the available 
indicators was being lost and  has driven some others to miss 
the opportunity to exit the trap when it was easier to do so.    
 
 
3. Hints from the literature on currency crises 
 
Currency crises are events which are mainly for fixed or 
pegged currencies. These crises have been so frequent since the 
demise of Bretton Woods that there are interesting and 
different explanations (Pesenti, Tille, 2000). The so-called 
first-generation model of currency crises indicates 
inconsistency between the policy stance and a structural 
imbalance in the exchange regime as the triggering factor for   8
the crisis. The second-generation models emphasise the role of 
expectations in that, at a certain point in time, a shift in 
expectations occurs making the exchange rate peg 
unsustainable. In the third-generation models it is the 
reduction in interest rates that makes firms and banks let   
domestic low-return, but risky, investments rise to 
unsustainable levels.  
 
The first or oldest theory is far from being useless. In 
the case of the EMU, some countries have unsustainable 
internal imbalances in the current account. Excessive 
borrowing in the private and public sectors also made the 
third-generation theories relevant. Furthermore, the sudden 
surge in spreads in government debt that materialized in 2010 
and the ensuing contagion are clearly fitted by the second-
generation models. The basic point to be borne in mind is that 
EMU member countries are obviously bound by an internal 
fixed exchange rate regime, but they no longer have their own 
domestic currency. Thus theories classified in the three 
generations do not immediately fit the euro crisis because the 
EMU does not have, per se, all the symptoms of the canonical 
domestic currency crisis. 
 
The two episodes should actually be seen as crises in a 
floating currency as the euro is allowed to free float vis-à-vis 
all other major currencies. One possibility is a crash following 
a sudden exchange rate movement caused by carry-trade 
unwinding (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). A carry trade is a 
market situation whereby the currency paying the higher return 
or the investment currency slowly appreciates over the funding 
currency. As such, a carry trade violates the UIP, i.e. the 
condition whereby the currency paying the higher return 
suddenly appreciates while being expected to depreciate by the 
same extent as the spread. Yet the euro is not an obvious 
funding currency as official interest rates, short term money 
market rates, EURIBOR and LIBOR interest rates and Treasury 
bill rate of returns are all quite high, on average, vis-à-vis the 
same rates in other typical funding currencies. It is therefore 
arguable that the single currency lacks the basic features of 
any true funding currency and that carry-trade unwinding was 
certainly not the case of the euro in 2008 and 2010. Neither 
can the 2008-2009 crisis be adequately paralleled to the 7-8 
October 1998 flash-crash of the US dollar against the yen (one-
day 7% loss). The role of algorithm trading in that sharp, 
flashy and unexpected fall has not yet been carefully 
investigated. 
   
A different paradigm is the crisis of a reserve currency   9
losing its reserve currency status. This event could come in at 
least two forms. The first is a large and prolonged depreciation 
of a fiat currency vis-à-vis other instruments. This was 
typically the case of the years 1971-1974. At that time the US 
dollar depreciated against gold, but it was actually gold − not 
the US dollar − that was losing its status in the international 
monetary system as the dollar survived as the key reserve 
instrument. As regards the second possibility, a vast literature 
developed regarding the crisis in a reserve currency deriving 
from intrinsic weaknesses of the domestic economy. This 
literature led to the ongoing debate on the reform of the 
international monetary system. The debate about the likelihood 
of a future dollar crisis developed during the last twenty years 
or so (e.g. Obstfeld-Rogoff, 2004; Krugman, 2007) and 
addressed the issue of US current account deficit 
sustainability, which is obviously entirely different from the 
lost link with gold. More recently, the introduction of the euro 
and its expanding role in global exchange reserves fuelled the 
debate about the alleged flaws in the design of the European 
monetary union and the ensuing intrinsic weaknesses of the 
single currency (Galati and Wooldridge, 2006; Pisani-Ferry 
and Posen, 2009). The steep falls in 2008 and 2010 obviously 
rekindled the discussion about the role of the single currency 
as reserve instrument and even about its sustainability (Alcidi 
et al., 2010). The weaknesses of the historical reserve 
currencies and the surge of emerging economies are obviously 
forerunners of significant changes in the current international 
reserve system and in exchange rates as well. This issue cannot 
be dealt adequately without considering that exchange rates 
have a role to play in the complex process needed to rebalance 
saving and investment in the different economies. The 
dislocation of the rates at which the dollar, the euro and all 
other currencies –the renminbi included— could be substantial. 
Although it is commonplace to argue about unsustainable 
imbalances, a real global rebalancing is more an analytic 
expedient than a warranted and observable outcome in the real 
world. The existing pattern of surpluses, deficits and monetary 
privileges, indeed, will probably evolve into a different 
distribution of imbalances and privileges. The dislocation, 
never the less, could assume the features of a real exchange 
rate crisis in some cases. The US currently has a gigantic 
outside circulation of dollars and a large and unsustainable 
deficit to reduce; China has a small outside circulation while 
having a large and unsustainable surplus to trim. Its large stock 
of reserves offers a potential contribution to global liquidity 
with which China, at least in part, already feeds the 
international money and bond market. The EU has a significant 
outside circulation without any special imbalance to correct, in   10
the aggregate. Exchange rates and other economic variables, 
such as interest rates, prices, saving and investment, have a 
role to play in the evolution/rebalance process of the existing 
pattern, but − ultimately− an outside circulation is 
indispensable, if the international monetary system is to remain 
in place to do the job. The present article modestly aims at 
focusing the interdependencies between interest rates in the 
international monetary market and the USD/EUR exchange rate 
and it is to this issue that we are turning.  
 
 
4. Cyclic LIBOR spreads and exchange rates 
 
 
Soaring trade in financial assets and innovation has made 
people increasingly look at a currency as the price of an asset, 
yet the foreign exchange market still quotes the relative price 
of a pair of media of exchange. Thus the size of the foreign 
exchange market can be gauged by the daily turnover only, 
rather than by capitalization. The foreign exchange market 
peculiarly neither goes up nor down since each day half of the  
currencies appreciate and half depreciate. In terms of daily 
turnover, the foreign exchange market is the largest market of 
all (BIS 2010b). Innovation is making it also one of the fastest 
markets. According to the last survey of the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS, 2010b) daily turnover averaged 
4000 billion US dollars in April 2010. The turnover has been 
growing substantially as it was only 1934 billion in April 2004 
and 3 324 billion in April 2007 and the flood of liquidity that 
started in 2008 certainly did not fail to reinforce the latest 
trend, which is predicted to continue until quantitative easing 
ends in the United States. The exchange market is bank 
dominated in that the daily turnover in the interbank market 
was about 1.4 trillion (38.8%) in April 2010, while the trading 
activity in which at least one counterpart is a hedge fund, 
pension fund, mutual fund or insurance company increased to 
47.7% of turnover. While the foreign exchange market is 
dominated by banks, the offshore or euro currency market is 
really dominated by the major currencies
12  The US dollar is 
still the most traded currency since in almost 85% of the trades 
in April 2010 it represented one side of the deal. The euro is 
second (39% of the trades). The yen is third (19%). While the 
US dollar and the yen were then in slow retreat from their peak 
shares reached in 2001, the euro was then still gaining market 
share. In April 2010 the US dollar–euro currency pairs 
accounted for 1.1 trillion of daily turnover. 
                                                 
12 At the London inter-bank market the currencies are ten.   11
 
Investors who use the exchange market as a vehicle for 
purely speculative investment coexist with those who use it 
because they literally need to buy or sell a particular currency 
to trade in goods and services or move capital; and those who 
simply turn to it for liquidity. The first dominant instrument 
amounted to 56.3% of turnover in April 2010 and is formed by 
outright forwards and foreign exchange swaps. FX swaps are 
transactions involving the exchange of two currencies on a 
specific date at a rate agreed at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract and a reverse exchange at a date further in the 
future at a different or equal rate, depending on the 
circumstances, also agreed at the time of the contract. In April 
2010 spot transactions generated about 37,4% of turnover and 
represented the second dominant instrument. 
 
USD/EUR FX swaps are typically used to raise liquidity across 
the international US and euro money markets. These markets 
are linked to the domestic money markets since euro banks 
compete with domestic banks by bidding higher rates on 
deposits and asking lower rates on loans. The rate spread in an 
FX swap is implicit in the forward premium/discount  1 /  S F  
where S and F are the spot and forward
13 price of the euro in 
terms of the US dollar. The forward premium/discount 
represents the cost of covering and is the alternative to the cost 
borne in the cash market where the spread is  EU US i i  . If the 
latter equals the forward premium/discount, the covered 
interest parity or CIP is said to hold as a no-arbitrage 
condition: ) 1 ( ) 1 ( EU US i F i S    . Covered interest arbitrage is 
expected to align the LIBOR spread to the premium/discount 
quickly by increasing the interest rate in the funding currency 
and depressing it in the investment currency. With the 
exclusion of periods of turbulence, such as those experienced 
recently, the CIP condition holds approximately since the 
premium/discount stays inside a tolerance or neutral band 
1 / ) (     S F i i EU US 
14, yet as a matter of fact the analysis that 
follows shows a forward puzzle, i.e. that the euro, which 
actually is high yielding vis-à-vis the US dollar, keeps 
appreciating when its LIBOR rate spread is increasing.    
 
This view of the forward markets assumes that 
expectations do not have an explicit role to play since the 
forward premium/discount is basically equal to the interest 
spread, a feature that long ago Tsiang (1959) recognized as a 
limit. Indeed, in the FX forward market, risk-averse 
                                                 
13 Transaction costs and the different types of risks are priced in forward rates. 
14 Frenkel and Levitch (1975) have estimated the tolerance margin .    12
speculators obviously buy the euro only when they expect to be 
able to sell it in the spot market at a higher price in the future, 
i.e. when
e S F  , but they will buy the US dollar when they 
expect to be able to sell it at a higher price, i.e. when the 
reverse condition 
e S F   holds. The equilibrium forward 
exchange rate then results from the interaction between 
speculators and hedgers each with their own degree of risk 
aversion thus, according to the theory of the forward exchange 
rate market advanced by Tsiang (1959), the equilibrium 
forward exchange rate results not only from the interest rate 
parity i.e.  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( * EU US i i S S    , but also from expectations 
about the future spot rate 
e S and risk aversion of speculators 
and hedgers. According to Tsiang, the forward exchange rate 
may be quite far from the parity and close to its own expected 
future spot rate 
e S if speculators are more risk averse than 
hedgers. A second limit is that the condition  1 / ) (    S F i i EU US  
offers a premium/discount in the exchange and no information 
on the spot rate independent from the forward rate, which is a 
problem given that the forward premium is not a useful 
prediction on the future direction of change in the spot rate 
(see, e.g. Taylor, 1995, on the forward bias). Given that 
LIBOR spreads are cyclic, we want to understand whether 
cyclicity in the spread can provide any information on the 
future direction of change in the spot rate which, arguably, 
could be the basis on which expectations are formed.  
 
Among the various factors that affect a  currency’s 
value, the differences in interest rates across countries 
certainly count for more than other factors such as trade, 
growth and politics particularly if they are high as was the case 
in 2007-2008. Interest rates vary continuously and information 
on them comes in with major frequency. Expectations of 
capital appreciation/depreciation on currency holdings, 
therefore, are naturally driven by information and expectations 
on interest spreads, at least in the short period. As the interest 
rate in a given currency rises, the currency’s value often 
increases
15. The effects on the capital flow depend on what 
happens to expectations about the currency. If the appreciation 
is coupled with an expected depreciation equal to the interest 
rate spread,  1 /    S S i i
e
EU US , the market settles in the UIP, or 
no-arbitrage, condition which halts capital movement. Yet, if 
the same appreciation (depreciation) triggers an expectation of 
further appreciation, a capital inflow (capital outflow) will 
pave the way for a further currency appreciation 
                                                 
15 Depending on how the market evaluates the nature of the rise, the currency’s value could 
actually go up or down.    13
(depreciation), a phenomenon which usually emerges under 
carry trade. Thus what matters most in the short run are 
interest rate spreads since they bear upon expectations on 
exchange rates.  
 
In analysing LIBOR dollar and euro rates, we found that 
spreads in LIBOR rates have clear effects on exchange rates 
and expectations
16. Usually the LIBOR dollar rates are lower 
than the LIBOR euro counterparts although LIBOR spreads 
widen and narrow in a cyclic fashion. The pattern that emerges 
from data can be defined as one according to which the 
narrowing (broadening) of the spread   0   US EU i i  weakens 
(strengthens) the euro. The narrowing of the reverse spread 
0   US EU i i  strengthens the euro thus we argue that LIBOR 
spreads matter more for guessing the USD/EUR current and 
expected exchange rate than for the premium/discount on the 
exchange rate. 
 
Spreads follow cycles and their swings unambiguously 
suggest the direction of spot exchange. As an example, let’s 
consider the 2007-2008 period. At that time, LIBOR rates were 
particularly high as they ranged in the 3-6% interval since risk 
perception and illiquidity were making interest rates rise 
dramatically. In early 2007, the euro was appreciating even 
though the spread  UE US i i   was positive and the progressive 
reduction of the spread advantage of the dollar was seemingly 
pushing up the single currency.  During the last quarter of 
2007, the spread turned in favour of the euro  0   UE US i i and the 
single currency rose. During the second half of 2008, the 
spread was in favour of the euro, but the advantage was 
faltering and the euro weakened because the LIBOR dollar 
spiked. This is clearly shown in Figure 2 which reports the 
spot rate and the value of the  parity  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( * EU US i i S S     for 
three different maturities during the first and the fourth quarter 
in 2007. The same is done for the period ranging from end July 
to October 2008. Figure 3 shows data on the 1-m and 3-m 
spreads. A strong positive relation seems to exist between the 
spread  US EU i i  and the spot rate in all the three periods just 




                                                 
16 We are not short of theories and empirical models on exchange rates. Frenkel and 
Levitch (1975), Frankel and Rose (1994),  Taylor (1995) , Pesenti and Tille (2000), 
Krugman (2007) and Eichengreen and Rua (2011) provide a comprehensive view of the 
literature.   14
 
 
Figure 2 -  The USD/EUR Exchange Rate and 1-m, 3-m and 1-y Parities 







1 2 3 9 10 11 12 7 8 9 10
















-2 -1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5 2





Figure 4 reports data ranging from November 2009 to 
May 2010 and from February to May 2011. It basically   15
confirms the findings above. Then the climate in the national 
and international money markets was quite different from that 
of 2007-8 period in that the unprecedented monetary expansion 
had quelled markets and LIBOR rates were back inside the 
normal 0-2% range. During the first time interval, the single 
currency had a limited and slowly narrowing positive spread 
0   US EU i i . The euro continued easing vis-à-vis the US dollar 
until May 2010, when the spread had almost vanished. During 
the time interval February – end April 2011, the spread was 
wider than a year earlier and was still enlarging. The 
enlargement did not fail to pull the single currency above the 
US dollar 1.4 line. In April the spread suddenly ceased to 
widen and the single currency continued its ascent for a while, 
and then fell. Figure 5 shows the strong relation between the 1-
m spread and the spot rate for the November 2009 – May 2010 
period and for January-early April 2011. The same pattern is 
replicated in the 3-m spread figures. What emerges from the 
comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 5 is that, for instance, a 
USD/EUR spot rate equal to $ 1.3 is consistent with negative 
LIBOR spreads (in 2007 and 2008) and also with positive 
LIBOR spreads (in 2009-2010-2011). This obviously confirms 
that a given spread, while satisfying the CIP, can coexist with 
many different levels of the spot rates. Our point was that we 
actually know the entire time profile of each spread and thus 
that it is the cycle in this profile that can be used as a 
heuristic
17 for guessing the direction of change of the spot rate 
and expectations on the future spot exchange rate over short 
periods of time. The direction of change is quite important to 
investors since at least two of the three dominant strategies can 
profit from its knowledge and possibly reinforce the trend 
itself. Trend trades are based on technical analysis and seek to 
exploit a deep knowledge of the trend and its turning points. 
Carry trades allow investor to buy high-yielding or investing 
currencies by selling low-yielding or funding currencies. Carry 
traders must be confident that they will not be forced to 
unwind their positions by any surprise change in the trend in 
interest rates or by a sudden restraint in liquidity.  
 
                                                 
17  A different heuristic can be found in the statistical data on the 
commitments of commercial and non-commercial traders  reported by the 
US Commodity Futures Trading Commission or in the term structure of 
the exchange rate expectations implied by Eurocurrency yield curves.  
 





Figure 4 - USD/EUR Exchange Rate and 1-m, 3-m and 1-y Parities 
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Over the longer period of time, the nominal exchange 
rate has an obvious role to play in the adjustment in the real 
economy, particularly when prices move sluggishly and the 
real exchange rate mimics the nominal one. This adjustment 
takes place through changes in real exchange rates and in the 
long run real interest rates matter simply because they hinge 
directly upon real exchange rates. Thus, changes in nominal 
interest rates can be irrelevant to the nominal exchange rate if 
the changes in nominal interest rates fail to move the level of 
real interest rates in the right direction and thus appreciate or 
depreciate the national currency in real terms. In April 2011 
interest rates were trending upward. Indeed, the European 
Central Bank had moved ahead of the Federal Reserve by 
joining the ranks of central banks that had started to tackle the 
rise in inflation expectations with higher interest rates
18.  
 
These findings have some policy implications. In the 
first place, exchange rate gyrations have obvious effects on the 
different economies which manifest themselves in domestic 
monetary policy decisions and, sometimes, unilateral or 
coordinated interventions in the foreign exchange markets.  In 
the second place, the current arrangement of the international 
monetary system and global finance cannot work without the 
Eurocurrency markets or some other form of outside 
circulation. Since in the Eurocurrency markets country risks 
are absent and substitutability is highest, currency substitution 
is pervasive. Exchange rate volatility is then inevitable and 
thus here to stay. These policy implications will be further 




5. Policy considerations 
 
The very existence of Eurocurrency, i.e. offshore 
markets for the domestic currencies, has always been regarded 
with suspicion by regulators. The reason is that offshore 
markets for currencies, bonds and derivatives basically allow 
banks to achieve their desired asset and liability positions 
partially escaping the regulation in the domestic jurisdiction. 
Suspicion has grown recently since derivatives had a special 
role in and after the recent 2007-8 crisis.  
 
As far as the outside market for the domestic currency is 
concerned, preoccupations are understandable since the 
existing stock of bank time deposits, and thus loans at London 
                                                 
18 The Reserve Bank of Australia was the first to raise interest rates (April 2010).   18
and at the other offshore centres, bears directly upon the 
demand and the supply sides of the money market in the 
domestic economy and has grown enormously over the years 
(Dufey and Giddy, 1994; Cassis, 2005; BIS, 2010a).  The 
existence of offshore markets also bears on monetary and 
financial stability because they are less regulated than onshore 
markets. Offshore banking, like any other type of banking 
activity, adds to aggregate liquidity. Yet, according to some 
early assessments (e.g. McKenzie, 1992;  Dufey and Giddy, 
1994), national central banks have been able to retain control 
of domestic monetary policy. However, starting from the 
Eighties central banks have increasingly realized that outside 
circulation compounded the uncertainties surrounding the 
relationship between money growth and inflation and from the 
early Nineties have replaced traditional quantitative targeting 
with inflation targeting and the direct control of interest rates.  
 
Offshore markets for time deposits and loans in US 
dollars and euro are obviously different from the FX, i.e. the 
foreign exchange rate market, where means of payments are 
traded in pairs, yet the interdependencies between the two 
Eurocurrency markets and the FX market are complex. From 
one side, exchange rates impact on costs, inflation rates and 
thus on domestic monetary policy; from the other, domestic 
monetary policy and domestic interest rates feed upon LIBOR 
rates, whose behaviour has a bearing on exchange rates. 
Indeed, the later link was the issue of the preceding paragraph, 
in which we argued that there is evidence of a clear relation 
between the time profile of LIBOR rates and the trend in the 
USD/EUR exchange rates. In the current transition phase of the 
international monetary arrangement, domestic regulation and 
exchange rate policy matter a lot for phenomena such as 
currency substitution, competition among financial centres, and 
internationalization of currencies.  
  
Offshore or Eurocurrency markets are definitely for 
reserve currencies and, to a lesser extent, for  the currencies of 
developed countries such as the Australian dollar and the 
Canadian dollar
19. The current international monetary 
arrangement, which is structured around the US dollar and a 
handful of national currencies
20, needs to allow the national 
currencies to circulate outside the origin countries and this 
creates a tension between the needs of the international 
monetary system and the management of money and credit 
inside the single countries. Currently, the outside circulation is 
                                                 
19 These are the so-called commodity currencies. 
20 The currency ranking can be approximated by the share in the deposits at the offshore 
banks.    19
made possible by offshore markets. To be deposited in offshore 
banks, the mass of offshore US dollars and euro must yield 
more than what can be earned in the onshore banks. To be 
borrowed profitably, loans at offshore banks must be priced 
below their onshore equivalent. Indeed, the absence of reserve 
requirements, the lower level of remaining costs and the 
absence of country risk make the offshore banks undercut 
onshore banks by asking for narrower spreads (Dufey and 
Giddy, 1994). Yet competition reigns among the international 
currencies at the international banks at the international 
financial centres. The cheaper currencies are called funding 
currencies, particularly if they are deemed to depreciate
21, 
because they offer the cheapest source for getting a loan to 
investors worldwide. The dearest currencies are called 
investing currencies, particularly if they are expected to 
appreciate since they offer the most profitable destination of 
liquidity. The peculiar feature of any bank in the Eurocurrency 
market therefore is that of offering US dollar (euro) deposit 
rates which compete with the higher US corresponding 
domestic rates and, at the same time, with the deposit rates in 
the parallel euro (US dollar) Eurocurrency markets. The same 
Eurocurrency bank bids a US dollar (euro) loan rate which, 
while being lower than the corresponding US dollar (euro) 
domestic rate faces the competition of the parallel euro (US 
dollar) Eurocurrency banks. We argue that competition exerts a 
force that narrows spreads across currencies, while differences 
in the policy stance across countries bring the spread into 
existence and make it widen. The two forces are opposite and 
thus make spread cycles and currencies swing, as we have 
pointed out. Our basic contention is that the domestic monetary 
policies and conditions in the US and the euro zone and the 
just sketched competition mechanism produced the correlation 
shown in Figures 2 and 4.  
 
There are distinct forces favouring the growth in size of 
the international money market, of which the US dollar and the 
euro are the two larger parts. We have already argued that the 
existing international monetary arrangements need an 
international money market where banks, companies and 
investors can deposit and borrow international currencies with 
the lowest possible transaction costs and country risk. London 
and New York are not alone since this market is formed by a 
whole network of banks whose offshore portions are clustered 
in London and in a number of other international centres 
(Goez, 2010). The business of international banking is highly 
profitable and this entails incentives for the different centres 
                                                 
21 According to the uncovered and the covered interest parity conditions, they should 
appreciate.   20
and countries to adopt strategies by offering the best business 
environment, infrastructure, stable tax regime and regulation to 
gain a larger share of the whole global business. Among the 
various location advantages able to attract international banks, 
under-regulation is key. However, the under-regulation 
keenness found at every single competing location inevitably 
reduces the chances of reaching a common and thus really 
effective regulation strategy at a global level. The resulting 
tension is certified by the current diatribe between the US, UK 
and Asia over regulation (FT, 8 June 2011). It is safe to predict 
that global growth will increase the size of the international 
banking and offshore markets of national currencies along the 
trend observed in the last few decades although increased 
regulation, limits to capital mobility and regime changes in the 
international monetary system could temper  or modify the 
trend.  
 
There are forces that shape the composition of reserves, 
too. The observed structure of the Eurocurrency market is the 
result of currency substitution. The latter reflects the fact that 
in today’s globalized economy many agents, and notably 
international banks, have assets and liabilities in more than one 
currency. Agents obviously constantly try to minimize the risks 
of holding assets in depreciating currencies and liabilities in 
appreciating ones. Anticipations of significant changes in 
exchange rates thus inevitably trigger currency substitution 
which might turn into a full-blown crisis with all its disruptive 
effects. Indeed, when the amount of currency circulating 
outside the country is large relative to that circulating inside, 
as is by definition the case of the US dollar, the shift in the 
demand resulting from the reaction to anticipations might have 
huge destabilizing effects. Exchange rate policies of central 
banks and, particularly, coordinated interventions in the 
exchange market aim at mitigating or inhibiting such 
phenomena. As a matter of fact, the rates of exchange between 
the major free floating currencies are not entirely free since 
coordinated interventions aimed at correcting excessively large 
changes have been infrequent, but not rare, during the last few 
decades. Central banks managing the existing reserve 
currencies primarily target their monetary policies to domestic 
inflation and growth, but have sometimes felt free to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market. The desire to limit the 
repercussions of exchange rate volatility was dictated more by 
domestic inflation and growth considerations, and thus by their 
interest rate policy, rather than by any particular target zone or 
value for the exchange rate. As a matter of fact, with their 
interventions to reduce the fluctuations of the single currency, 
central banks implicitly dampened the fluctuations of the   21
Special Drawing Right, i.e. of the basket currency which from 
a mere unit of account is expected to surge to the role of key 
reserve unit. 
 
Given that China and other emerging economies have 
become giant participants in world trade and large suppliers of 
saving, companies, commercial and central banks worldwide 
could start finding it convenient to hold balances in renminbi, 
rupees and so forth. Historically, all countries that have 
become leaders in terms of production and trade, have made 
their own currency a vehicle and reserve instrument. China, in 
particular, is set to surpass the US and the EU in these regards, 
but the process leading to the acquisition of the status of 
vehicle and reserve currency is long as its advance depends on 
many factors. The international demand for any currency as a 
vehicle and a reserve currency depends on intrinsic 
characteristics of the currency such as liquidity, stability and 
confidence in its value and convertibility. The supply depends 
on the existence of an adequate outside circulation of the 
currency. China is promoting as much as possible the role of 
renminbi as a vehicle currency in the bloc in East Asia, not 
only by trying to stabilize domestic inflation and the 
renminbi’s bilateral exchange rates, but also by offering time 
deposits and loans at rates competitive with onshore and 
offshore interest rates. In the future it will certainly allow 
foreigners holding renminbi to buy many assets in China and 
not only goods which will make the willingness to hold 
renminbi soar worldwide.   
 
We argued that the Eurocurrency or offshore markets for 
domestic currencies, bonds and other assets such as derivatives 
allow banks to achieve their desired asset and liability 
positions and partially escape the regulation in the domestic 
jurisdiction. However, the US and the EU, whose currencies 
have a preeminent role and China, which is trying to get one in 
the existing international monetary system, basically accept the 
status quo at least because to work properly the system needs 
to let reserve currencies have an outside circulation formed by 
their currencies. In the second place, international banking is a 
highly sophisticated and profitable economic activity and thus 
highly qualified from the point of view of politicians and 
managers looking after the economic attractiveness and 
fortunes of individual cities. From a purely economic point of 
view, the outside circulation of international currencies 
increases (for better or for worse) the overall efficiency and 
profitability of intermediation. During the 2007-8 crisis, the 
offshore markets and the foreign exchange rate market (Baba 
et. al, 2010) even had the capacity to reduce the liquidity gap   22
and the ensuing strain in domestic money markets.     
 
In the previous section we argued that LIBOR rates 
reflect conditions prevailing in domestic monetary policy and 
that changes in LIBOR spreads have driven the swings in 
exchange rates from 2007 to 2011. From this it follows that 
these swings are indirect effects of divergences in national 
monetary policies. Exchange rates feed upon domestic prices 
and domestic inflation which, in turn, is the prime target of 
monetary policy in countries where the central bank adopts 
inflation targeting. At the same time, the effects on domestic 
inflation exerted by exchange rates are only one of the reasons 
why central banks decide to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market directly and sometimes in a coordinated way. We do not 
intend to analyse this aspect and we limit ourselves to recalling 
that there is extensive literature on the relatively limited 
influence of exchange rate changes on domestic inflation or 
pass-through in large and high-income  economies such the US 
and the EU (Taylor, 2000) . It would nevertheless be unwise to 
rate down the domestic implications of nominal exchange rate 
changes since such nominal changes bear upon real exchange 
rates and, in turn, the current account balance and net foreign 
country liabilities.  In other words, real exchange rates follow 
passively the vagaries of nominal exchange rates. The latter 
are felt as excessive because the pass-through is limited. Not 
surprisingly, excessive volatility is felt as a problem, but quite 
paradoxically, even too little flexibility is showing it has its 
own limits.   
 
Inside the European Monetary Union, the nominal 
appreciation of the common currency should be followed by a 
lower rate of increase in domestic prices, otherwise the 
member countries would see their real exchange rate appreciate 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In the case of the euro zone, 
inflation rates have been permanently different across 
countries. The peripheral economies, in particular, have not 
been able to make their rates of productivity growth and unit 
cost converge adequately to the average thus the euro zone is 
affected by structural misalignments in its internal real 
exchange rates. Indeed, although the euro floats against the US 
dollar and the other currencies, the real exchange rates of the 
single member countries present serious misalignments both 
inside and outside the euro zone. These misalignments reflect 
both the pass-through and the existing structural differences in 
the inflation rates in that  countries where prices increase 
structurally faster than the average suffer from a comparatively 
higher overvaluation. The problem that follows from these 
misalignments is the combination of a structural current   23
account imbalance with a growing net foreign debt and an 
overvalued currency. After the great 2007-2008 crisis, unlike 
the stronger members of the euro-zone, some peripheral 
economies suddenly faced a steep fall in the growth rate and a 
steep rise in the interest rate on their debt.  A sudden stop in 
the inflow of capital occurred. Those countries can neither bear 
the overvaluation of the common currency, nor they can easily 
correct the overvaluation and thus resume their previous 
growth trend. They cannot even exit and adopt their old 
national currency because the ensuing inevitable depreciation 
of their old currency would expose them to the worst possible 
currency mismatch in the domestic banks and thus to deep 
financial instability.  
 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
In the analysis regarding the few skirmishes that the US 
dollar and the euro had from 2007 to 2011, we gleaned a few 
small lessons on what has driven, and possibly what will drive, 
the USD/EUR exchange rate in the short run, in the current 
international monetary arrangement. This arrangement is a de 
facto multi-polar system entailing a consistent outside 
circulation of the US dollar and a few other national currencies 
and a gigantic and ever expanding FX market. In this market 
the pillars of the whole system are exposed to all the vagaries 
of market sentiment, if not to real full-blown crises. The FX 
market is an asset class of its own; it is increasingly tied to 
other asset classes and to the outside market for national 
currencies. The bottom line of our analysis is the  clear 
empirical relation between the time profile of the spread in US 
dollar and euro LIBOR rates and the USD/EUR exchange rate, 
i.e. a stylized fact regarding how the impulse coming from the 
money market bears upon the exchange rate of the two major 
currencies. The two recent and distinct sharp falls of the euro 
against the US dollar in 2008 and 2010 show that instability is 
entirely possible. The falls were almost identical in size, but 
rather different in nature. Indeed, the first fall of the euro was 
the effect of a sudden unwinding of positions held by investors 
in different asset markets reflecting a sharp liquidity 
constraint. The unwinding triggered the sharp appreciation of 
the dollar. The second episode was the reaction of the 
exchange market reflecting a fall in confidence in the euro and 
amid abundant liquidity, i.e. an environment exactly the 
opposite of that in 2008 (Sections 1 and 2).  
 
We considered three distinct periods from 2007 to 2008 
which were characterized by peculiarly high interest rates in   24
domestic and international money markets and two episodes 
from 2009 to 2011 which, instead, were characterized by 
definitely lower interest rates everywhere. LIBOR rates are far 
from being equalized across countries. They are tied to interest 
rates prevailing in the domestic money markets but are 
interconnected. They also show spreads that are definitely 
cyclical, as is the case for interest rates. The time profile of 
LIBOR rates for the different maturities seems able to guide 
the trend in the USD/EUR exchange rate in a different way 
from that predicted by interest rate parities. More exactly, 
while the covered interest rate parity predicts that the high-
yielding currency appreciates and, at the same time, is 
expected to depreciate against the low-yielding currency, we 
found that it appreciates (depreciates) gradually when its 
spread increases (decreases). The same currency changes 
direction only when the spread changes its own direction 
(Section 3). This finding is an interesting one as it affects our 
view of how the market in which the reserve currencies − the 
pillars of the current international monetary system − operates.   
 
The existence and working of Eurocurrency and FX 
markets pose obvious macroeconomic policy problems which 
have been succinctly discussed in this paper. The most obvious 
problem is perhaps that stemming from the excessive volatility 
of the exchange rates of reserve currencies. In the short run, 
exchange rate swings reflect what is going on in the domestic 
and the international money markets and could provoke large 
and unintentional substitution phenomena among reserve 
currencies. Such swings obviously feed back on to the 
domestic economies through wealth and saving-investment 
balance notwithstanding the limited pass-through prices. It is 
easy to predict that the current pattern of imbalances and 
privileges, together with the structure of foreign reserves, is 
evolving rapidly rather than rebalancing.  Further important 
issues are raised by the seemingly unstoppable growth of the 
international money and foreign exchange markets; and these 
have also been discussed in Section 4. The biggest issue is 
certainly the regulation of finance in general and that of 
international banking in particular. The business is big and 
equally vital for the urban centres hosting it. The competition 
between the historical and emerging international financial 
centres is strong; and the ambitions of China and other large 
emerging economies vis-à-vis those of old Europe and America 
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